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We know a great deal about the neurophysiological mechanisms supporting instrumental 
actions, i.e., actions designed to alter the physical state of the environment. In contrast, little 
is known about our ability to select communicative actions, i.e., actions directly designed to 
modify the mental state of another agent. We have recently provided novel empirical evidence 
for a mechanism in which a communicator selects his actions on the basis of a prediction of 
the communicative intentions that an addressee is most likely to attribute to those actions. 
The main novelty of those findings was that this prediction of intention recognition is cerebrally 
implemented within the intention recognition system of the communicator, is modulated by 
the ambiguity in meaning of the communicative acts, and not by their sensorimotor complexity. 
The characteristics of this predictive mechanism support the notion that human communicative 
abilities are distinct from both sensorimotor and linguistic processes.
Keywords: fMRI, joint action, intention recognition
IncIdental and IntentIonal 
communIcatIon
In very general terms, animal communication 
exploits the correlations between signals and the 
contexts that induce them (Dawkins and Krebs, 
1978; Owings and Morton, 1998). Several organ-
isms can extract information from the behavior 
of other agents, i.e., behavior that inadvertently 
provides  information  to  onlookers  (Danchin 
et al., 2004; Oates et al., 2010). One popular exam-
ple, among many others, is given by the calls of 
vervet monkeys and baboons (Rendall et al., 2000; 
Seyfarth et al., 1980). It has been shown that they 
function as contact and alarm calls because eaves-
droppers learn to infer location and alarm state 
of the caller (Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007). The 
calls are not intentional in the sense that the caller 
does not seem to predict the context-dependent 
consequences of the interpretation process occur-
ring in listeners (Rendall et al., 2000). This type of 
inadvertent communicative behavior appears to 
rely on fixed associations between sensorimotor 
events and their communicative implications, i.e., 
one-to-one matches between physical and seman-
tic properties of an action (Maynard Smith and 
Harper, 1995). This communicative phenomenon 
is widespread in the animal world (Bargh et al., 
1996; Dyer, 2002; Hauser, 1996; Mather, 2004), 
and it could be supported by “mirror” neurons 
that  couple  perceived  and  executed  behaviors 
(Prather et al., 2008). This paper is concerned 
with  a  quite  different  type  of  communicative 
behavior, i.e., behaviors whose sole purpose is 
to have their intentions recognized by another 
agent (Grice, 1957). We label this type of behavior 
intentional communication, to distinguish it from 
the incidental communication described above. 
Intentional communicative actions, arguably the 
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last major evolutionary transition in the way infor-
mation is propagated across biological systems 
(Szathmary and Smith, 1995), appears to build on 
the ability to use cognitive variables (e.g., mental 
states like goals and desires) to disambiguate and 
predict behavior of other agents (Byrne and Bates, 
2006; Frith, 2007), a useful tool when faced with 
the challenge of coping with the mind of other 
cognitive agents (Humphrey, 1976). There is a 
long research tradition on how we could recog-
nize intentions in behaviors (Frith, 2006; Heider, 
1958; Kelley, 1973; Kruglanski, 1975; Malle et al., 
2001; Mcarthur, 1972; Nichols and Stich, 2003), 
and it has become clear that this ability is already 
computationally complex even under extremely 
simplified experimental scenarios (Baker et al., 
2009; van Rooij et al., 2008; Yoshida et al., 2008). 
Intentional  communication  goes  well  beyond 
those scenarios, requiring the ability to signal 
ones’ own intentions, i.e., to select which of an 
indefinite number of possible behaviors is most 
likely to be interpreted by a recipient as conveying 
a particular communicative intention, given the 
current commonly known knowledge [common 
ground, (Clark, 1996)]. Yet, some scholars have 
ignored this complexity, trying to reduce human 
communication  to  the  coding-decoding  of  a 
conventional message (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2007; Shannon, 1948; Tognoli et al., 2007). Even 
if this exhausted the nature of human commu-
nication, this account would not explain how we 
could build such conventions in the first place. 
Yet children do it, without prior knowledge of 
those conventions, up to the point of inventing 
new languages when deprived of a pre-existing 
one (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). In fact, all human 
communication rests on an inferential base, on 
top of which the coded message rides, otherwise 
ironies, sarcasms, hints, and indirections would 
pass us by. Nor are we troubled by the vagueness 
or multiple ambiguities and semantic generalities 
in every utterance (Levinson, 2000; Sperber and 
Wilson, 2001). The same system that resolves the 
coded messages probably lies behind our ability 
to communicate without any pre-existing con-
ventions at all, as in the gestures one might use 
behind the boss’ back, or to signal to others out 
of earshot. A number of converging paths of evi-
dence suggest that this faculty is distinct from our 
language abilities, and is ontogenetically and phy-
logenetically prior to language (Levinson, 2006), 
yet at the same time constitutes the foundation for 
effective language use. Here we illustrate some of 
the complexities inherent in studying the cogni-
tive and cerebral bases of this faculty, focusing on 
one of the first neurophysiological studies dealing 
with the production of human communicative 
actions (Noordzij et al., 2009), and delineating 
research lines opened up by those results (see also 
(de Ruiter et al., 2010; Newman-Norlund et al., 
2009; Willems et al., 2010) and http://www.fron-
tiersin.org/human_neuroscience/specialtopics/
understanding_human_intentiona/64.
cognItIve and neural mechanIsms for 
selectIng IntentIonal communIcatIve 
actIons
In order to understand our capacity to generate 
and interpret communicative actions, it might 
be useful to consider how it could emerge from 
the combination of simpler and experimentally 
tractable cognitive processes, using the layout sug-
gested by communicative skills we share with dif-
ferent taxa along our line of descent (Byrne, 1995; 
Herrmann et al., 2007). For instance, human com-
municators share with other vertebrates the infer-
ential mechanisms involved in identifying other 
biological agents from dynamic sensory stimuli 
(Blake, 1993; Oram and Perrett, 1996; Vallortigara 
et al., 2005). Well-studied examples are the ability 
to infer visual patterns of limb articulation from 
point-light displays (Puce and Perrett, 2003) or 
acoustic patterns of vocal identities from non-
linguistic sounds (Gervais et al., 2004; Ghazanfar 
et al., 2001). Being so basic and evolutionarily 
preserved, it is tempting to speculate that devel-
opmental alterations in these perceptual mecha-
nisms, as found in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
patients  (Dakin  and  Frith,  2005;  Zilbovicius 
et al., 2006), might have serious consequences 
for human social behavior. Both human psycho-
physics and computational models have suggested 
that perception of biological motion relies on 
extracting sequences of postures on the basis of 
dynamic form templates (Beintema and Lappe, 
2002; Giese and Poggio, 2003; Vaina and Gross, 
2004). This process can then be used for action 
segmentation (Baird and Baldwin, 2001; Baldwin 
and Baird, 2001). Accordingly, it appears relevant 
to test whether the basic inferential mechanisms 
involved in identifying other biological agents 
could also provide a viable computational sub-
strate for parsing a string of movements into 
communicative  versus  instrumental  segments, 
and  whether  these  mechanisms  are  used  for 
both perception and selection of communica-
tive actions.
Even if these basic perceptual processes could 
support the parsing problem faced by a commu-
nicator (i.e., “How can I mark the communicative 
elements of an action within a continuous stream 
of instrumental actions so they can be parsed 
by a recipient”), the brain still needs to resolve 
the mutual dependencies between that parsing 
Communicative action
An action designed to modify the 
cognitive environment of an addressee.
Instrumental action
An action designed to modify the 
physical environment of an agent.Noordzij et al.  Neural correlates of intentional communication
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2006), third-order intentional systems raise the 
issue of how our brain manages to integrate these 
time-varying and hierarchical relations between 
observable, planned, and un-observable events. 
How can the human brain solve the context-de-
pendency of communicative behaviors without 
collapsing under the astronomical computational 
demands entailed by this type of problem (van 
Rooij et al., 2010 under revision)? How are these 
processes, and in particular the considerable cog-
nitive control they entail, influenced by motiva-
tional drives toward prosocial behavior (Hrdy, 
2009; Roelofs et al., 2009)? Is the manipulation 
of these mental structures supported by dedicated 
cerebral circuits as hypothesized for other social 
constructs (Adolphs, 2009), or is it an instance of 
our ability to guide first-person behavior on the 
basis of mental models and future goals (Behrens 
et al., 2009)?
A cAse study of brAin mechAnisms 
underlying humAn communicAtion
We have started to address some of the issues 
introduced above in a recent report (Noordzij 
et al., 2009), using an experimental situation in 
which people have to communicate in the absence 
of an a priori common code (de Ruiter et al., 2010). 
We used this apparently artificial scenario in order 
to give emphasis to those mechanisms that create 
new communicative behaviors, rather than the 
utilization of existing conventions. The rationale 
was that in the absence of an a priori common 
code, the selection of an effective communica-
tive behavior needs to rely on some heuristics 
that constrain a potentially infinite search-space 
(Levinson, 1995). The study is based on the insight 
that a communicator could solve this problem by 
predicting how a particular addressee will inter-
pret a given behavior. We have tested the nature of 
this prediction, assessing whether the sender of a 
signal uses his own intention recognition system 
to predict the intention recognition performed 
by the addressee (or receiver). A neurophysiologi-
cal test of this hypothesis involves the ability to 
directly compare cerebral responses supporting 
both the production and the comprehension of 
communicative  actions.  Accordingly,  we  have 
measured behavioral and cerebral responses (with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) in 
subject pairs engaged in communicative exchange. 
In contrast to recent studies that have addressed 
human communicative abilities using pre-exist-
ing communicative conventions (Emmorey et al., 
2010; Green et al., 2009; Schippers et al., 2009; 
Straube et al., 2010; Walter et al., 2004), here we 
prevented the participants from using those con-
ventions, forcing them to generate and interpret 
problem  and  the  meaning-mapping  problem 
(i.e., “Given an intended meaning, which action 
would have the best chance of being correctly 
interpreted as an attempt to communicate that 
particular intended meaning?”). In this context, 
it might be relevant to move beyond basic per-
ceptual  mechanisms,  and  consider  a  different 
level of analysis, namely the ability to deal with 
mental states (Frith and Frith, 2006). To illustrate 
some of the complexities inherent in this level of 
analysis, imagine a customer in a bar grasping an 
empty glass from a table and raising it in the air, 
while looking at the bartender. Raising the glass 
for ordering a drink is a motorically simple action 
that belies the complex cognitive structures that 
underlie it, not to mention the largely unknown 
neurophysiological mechanisms supporting them. 
First, the customer needs to build a conceptual 
model of the bartender [including a Theory of 
Mind (Call and Tomasello, 2008; Premack and 
Woodruff, 1978)], assuming for instance that the 
person behind the bar-counter is willing to serve 
drinks on demand, at that particular time of the 
day, remembering previous orders, etc. Second, 
the customer needs to keep online this conceptual 
model of the bartender, without confusing it with 
his own factual knowledge. For instance, when 
looking at the bartender, the customer should 
not  confuse  the  momentary  lack  of  vision  of 
his own raised hand with the clear line of sight 
between the bartender gaze and the empty glass. 
Third, the customer needs to keep those pieces of 
knowledge separate from another crucial element, 
his knowledge of what he and the bartender pre-
sumably and mutually know and believe (Clark, 
1996). For instance, the customer needs to keep 
into account that both customer and bartender 
are informed about the glass being empty (so that 
the glass-raising action cannot be confused with 
toasting). This feat of representational capacity, 
an example of a third-order intentional system 
(Dennett, 1987), is arguably the simplest system 
that could support genuine intentional commu-
nication (Grice, 1957), and it involves a three-way 
relation between sender, receiver, and behavior 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Tomasello and Carpenter, 
2005). The crucial point here is that, for inten-
tional communication to occur, the glass-raising 
movement needs to be processed together with 
the mental structures it is designed to evoke in 
the communicators. Put differently, the meaning 
conveyed by the raised glass is not an intrinsic 
property of that action, as implied by some recent 
accounts of human communication (Iacoboni 
et al., 2005). Without denying the relevance of 
simpler forms of communication, like impera-
tive pointing (Leavens et al., 2010; Tomasello, 
Conceptual model
A non-linear combination of sensory 
and motor features able to generate 
new diagnostic features that 
characterize the conceptual model.
Third-order intentional system
A system with cognitive functions that 
take as argument other cognitive 
functions (of the system and/or of 
other systems) that are about yet other 
cognitive functions (e.g., I intend you 
to believe that I intend you to refill 
my glass).Noordzij et al.  Neural correlates of intentional communication
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Subject pairs played the Tacit Communication 
Game (TCG, (de Ruiter et al., 2010)). In the TCG 
two players (called the sender and the receiver) are 
new communicative visuomotor behaviors (see 
also (Galantucci, 2005; Scott-Phillips et al., 2009; 
Selten and Warglien, 2007)).
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FIguRe 1 | Sequence of events in a communicative trial of the TCg, and cerebral activity evoked in the sender 
and in the receiver during relevant trial epochs. 1. Sender and receiver see a 3 × 3 game board (in gray) on separate 
screens, with their own tokens (yellow, blue) positioned below and above the board, respectively. 2. The goal 
configuration appears on the board. During communicative trials, the sender, but not the receiver, can see the goal 
configuration to be achieved at the end of the trial. The sender needs to share this information with the receiver, and he 
can do so only by moving his token over the board. Planning these communicative actions increased metabolic activity in 
the pSTS of the sender’s brain (A, in red, MNI coordinates: 50, −42, 14, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons), as 
compared to planning similar movements during non-communicative trials (e; effect size: parameter estimates of a 
multiple regression analysis in standard error [SE] units), i.e., trials in which both players could see the goal configuration. 
3. When ready to move, the sender presses a start button and his token moves to the center of the board, being visible to 
both players. 4. Within 5 s, the sender needs to move his token on the board (with the controller shown in B) to inform the 
receiver about her goal position and to reach his own goal position. The sender’s token was visible to both players. The 
execution of these movements evoked no significant changes in the right pSTS activity of the sender’s brain (F). The 
observation of the same communicative actions increased right pSTS activity in the receiver’s brain (D, in red, MNI: 
coordinates: 56, −38, 6, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons), as compared to observing the same movements 
during non-communicative trials (g). The double arrow indicates repeated (vertical) movements of the sender’s token. 5. 
The receiver can plan her movements while the sender’s token remains visible to both players. 6. When ready to move, 
the receiver presses a start button and her token moves to the center of the board, being visible to both players. 7 . Within 
5 s, the receiver needs to move her token on the board (with the controller shown in C). The receiver’s token was visible 
to both players. The execution of these movements evoked no significant changes in the pSTS activity of the receiver’s 
brain (H). The curved arrow indicates a 90° rotation of the receiver’s token. 8. A green (correct) or red (incorrect) box 
appears indicating if both players successfully matched the goal configuration.Noordzij et al.  Neural correlates of intentional communication
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told they have to re-create a spatial configuration 
of two simple geometrical objects (one for the 
sender and one for the receiver) on a game board. 
The crucial manipulations are that the sender 
initially sees the spatial configuration, while the 
receiver doesn’t, and that the sender consequently 
has to communicate the position and orientation 
of the object of the receiver by means of mov-
ing his own object. Similar to Galantucci’s study 
(Galantucci, 2005), we force people to commu-
nicate with an unconventional communicative 
tool (i.e., moving a simple geometrical shape), 
thereby creating a situation without pre-existing 
communicative conventions (Figure 1). Using an 
event-related fMRI design, we can isolate cerebral 
activity evoked when planning a communicative 
action (Figure 1: phase 2, sender column), and 
when interpreting the meaning of that action 
(Figure 1: phase 4. receiver column).
The results indicate that planning communi-
cative actions (by a sender) and recognizing the 
communicative intention of the same actions (by 
a receiver) relies on spatially overlapping por-
tions of their brains. These cerebral responses, 
in both sender and receiver, were localized in the 
right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS, 
Figures 1A,D),  a  region  previously  associated 
with  attribution  of  intention  (Castelli  et  al., 
2000; Saxe et al., 2004), and they were independ-
ent  from  sensory  inputs  and  motor  outputs 
(Figures 1F,H). The response profile of the pSTS 
points to a contribution confined to planning 
and comprehension of communicative actions, 
being absent during the speeded execution of 
those communicative actions. It remains to be 
seen whether the pSTS response is driven by the Noordzij et al.  Neural correlates of intentional communication
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